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CASE ANALYSES
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston
I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent and controversial case of Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
and Bisexual Group of Boston,' the United States Supreme Court unanimously
held that a private parade organizer could not be compelled to accept a group
whose message it disagreed with as a parade participant. Specifically, the Court
held that to force the parade organizer, the South Boston Allied War Veterans
Council ("Council"), to include a gay and lesbian group in the parade violated
the organizer's First Amendment right of free speech in that it compelled speech
the Council did not choose to make. This note critiques the Court's opinion and
argues that because equality became the primary constitutional value as a result
of the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments, the focus of the First Amend-
ment was subsequently shifted from protection of the dominate culture to that of
the subordinate culture. Thus, the Supreme Court's protection of the Council's
First Amendment rights ignores the shift in the focus of the First Amendment
which is now intended to protect subordinated groups such as the gay and lesbi-
an association in this case.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND: FIRST AMENDMENT LAW APPLIED TO PARADES
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances.".. "A parade is, by its nature, a pristine
form of speech."3 Thus, if "peaceful and orderly, [parades] fall well within the
sphere of conduct protected by the First Amendment."4 Indeed, as one commen-
tator questioned, what could be "a more definitive and graphic way for someone
to manifest himself to the world than to march down the street... displaying
his allegiances for all to see[?]"5 From this premise, then, springs the notion that
1. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338
(1995).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. New York County Bd. of Ancient Order of Hibemians v. Dinkins, 814 F. Supp. 358, 366
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
4. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 112 (1969).
5. Larry W. Yackle, Parading Ourselves: Freedom of Speech at the Feast of St. Patrick, 73
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public streets "have immemorially been held in trust" for purposes of "communi-
cating thoughts between citizens."
This tradition notwithstanding, citizens, in fact, do not have free reign to use
the streets and parade whenever or however they please. Public streets, even
when characterized as the "quintessential 'public forum"', are still subject to
government regulation The government may constitutionally impose reasonable
time, place and manner regulations on the use of streets! For example, the Su-
preme Court has condoned licensing schemes that require would-be parade orga-
nizers to obtain parade permits.' The government may not, however, discrimi-
nate in its decision to grant or withhold permits on the basis of the content of
that expression." The government has no authority to withhold parade permits,
consequently restricting free speech, because of the parade's message, ideas,
subject matter or content." However, once a permit is granted, would-be orga-
nizers are entitled to proceed without interference. 2
III. HURLEY v. IRISH-AMERICAN GAY, LESBIAN AND BIsExuAL GROUP OF
BOSTON' 3
A. The "Evacuation-St. Patrick's Day Parade"
Boston's annual "Evacuation-St. Patrick's Day Parade" ("the Parade") is an
event of long standing in the city. The Parade commemorates one of the first
military victories of the Revolutionary War - the retreat of the royal troops and
Loyalists from Boston Harbor in 1776.'" As the story goes, General George
Washington called on the patron saint of Ireland and used "St. Patrick" as the
codeword among his troops the day of the retreat. 5 Thus, the Parade commem-
orates this historic event.
Over the past hundred years or so, March 17th, the date fixed for "Evacuation
Day", has been parlayed by Boston's Irish community into a St. Patrick's Day
celebration as well.' 6 The principle event is the Parade which typically attracts
B.U. L. REv. 791, 797 (1993). Professor Yackle's article provides a comprehensive discussion of First
Amendment free speech doctrine within the context of "parade law."
6. Id. at 797 (quoting Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
7. Yackle, supra note 5, at 797.
8. Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976)(citing Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 95 (1971)). As one court noted, a citizen does not have the right to hold a meeting "in
the middle of Times Square at the rush hour." Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965).
9. Cox, 379 U.S. at 558.
10. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Collins v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d
746 (7th Cir. 1972).
11. Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976) (citing Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95).
12. Yackle, supra note 5, at 801-02.
13. 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995).
14. Id. at 2341. For comprehensive discussion of the history of the Boston Parade as well as the
events leading to the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston's lawsuit against
the Council, see Yackle, supra note 5, at 834-50.
15. See Yackle, supra note 5, at 834-50.
16. Chris Reidy, The Greening of America: St. Patrick's Day Has Become More US Than Irish,
[Vol. VI: 125
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more than 20,000 marchers, legions of floats and marching bands as well as
more than 1,000,000 spectators. 7 The parade travels through Boston's South
End, affectionately known as "Southie," and is considered by some to be a "cul-
tural artifact" of the predominately blue collar neighborhood. 8
The Parade was once formally sponsored by the City of Boston. 9 Formal
city sponsorship ended, however, in 1947, when the mayor authorized the Coun-
cil to organize and conduct the Parade." The Parade has continued as a much
loved annual event, even in the absence of official city sponsorship.
B. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston and its Claim
In 1992, several lesbian women and gay men formed an organization known
as the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston ("GLIB")'
Shortly after its formation, GLIB decided to participate in the 1992 Parade. 2
The group's desire to participate in the Parade stemmed from their desire to "ex-
press pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals,
to demonstrate that there are such men and women among those so descended
and to express their solidarity with like individuals who sought to march in New
York's St. Patrick's Day Parade."'  Barbara Kay, a representative for GLIB,
requested and received registration information from the 1992 Parade's Grand
BOSTON GLOBE, 14, 1993, at Al9. See also Yackle, supra note 4, at 835.
17. Hurley, 115 S. CL at 2341. The 1992 and 1993 Parades were comprised of a variety of
marchers, floats and marching bands, including among others: U.S. Marine Corps Color Guard; Troy
High School Marching Band; Army National Guard; U.S.S. Constitution Color Guard and Pikemen;
U.S. Air Force Color Guard; U.S. Coast Guard Color Guard; Boston University, Marine and Navy
ROTC; South Boston Against Drugs Float; Marshfield High School Marching Band; Hallamore
Clydesdale Horses; Marion Manor Seniors Float; Leukemia Society Float; POW/MIA Float; South
Boston Baptist Bible Trolley Float; Irish Malden Leprechaun Float; Irish Currah Rowing Club Float;
Miss South Boston; Miss Ice-O-Rama; Miss Jr. Ice-O-Rama; Tin Can Sailors; Put America To Work
Float; Boston Police Drum & Bagpipes; Lexington Minutemen and the South Boston Yacht Club
Float. Brief for Petitioner at 38aa and 47aa, Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston, 115 S.Ct. 2338 (1995) (No. 94-749).
18. Yackle, supra note 5, at 835.
19. Brief for Respondent at 4, Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston, 115 S. CL 2338 (1995) (No. 94-749).
20. The South Boston Allied War Veterans Council is a "private, unincorporated, non-profit,
charitable organization of elected and appointed representatives from American Legion, Disabled
Veterans, and Veterans of Foreign Wars Posts in South Boston." Brief for Petitioner at 4, Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. CL 2338 (1995) (No. 94-749).
21. Hurley, 115 S. CL at 2341. See also Petitioner's Brief at 3-4, Hurley (No. 94-749).
22. Hurley, 115 S. CL at 2341. See also Petitioner's Brief at 3-4, Hurley (No. 94-749).
23. Hurley, 115 S. CL at 2341. The dispute surrounding the New York St. Patrick's Day Parade
involved the sponsoring organization's, the Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH), refusal to allow a
gay organization, the Irish Lesbian and Gay Organization (IGLO), to participate in the 1991 parade.
A compromise was reached in 1991, and IGLO marched in the parade. However, AOH refused to
allow IGLO to march in the 1992 parade. It was partly in support of IGLO's exclusion from the 1992
parade that GLIB was formed. For a comprehensive discussion of the controversy surrounding the
New York City parade, see Yackle, supra note 5, at 812-34.
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Marshall, Thomas Lyons.24 GLIB completed the form and applied to march in
the Parade.' Prior to voting on GLIB's application, the Council requested a
meeting with GLIB representatives.
GLIB and the Council differed as to what transpired at their initial meeting.
Lyons maintained that GLIB was merely asked for assurance that it would not
act in a confrontational manner and that GLIB refused. GLIB, on the other
hand, maintained that it was never asked for any assurances.' Within a few
days, the Council voted to deny GLIB's application to march in the Parade,
citing "public safety concerns" and doubts regarding GLIB's legitimacy.29
At the mayor's urging, the two groups met again and agreed that if permitted
to participate GLIB would limit its representation to twenty-five marchers carry-
ing GLIB banners.3" In addition, GLIB gave its assurance that it would conduct
itself appropriately.' Nevertheless, after reconsideration of GLIB's application,
the Council voted unanimously 2 to exclude GLIB from the Parade. The
Council's decision was based solely on its doubts as to GLIB's legitimacy. 3
GLIB immediately filed suit against the Council and the City of Boston.
GLIB first argued that because the Parade was itself a public forum, GLIB had a
First Amendment right to participate and could not be excluded. 4 Furthermore,
GLIB argued that their exclusion violated the state public accommodation law
which prohibited "any distinction, discrimination or restriction on account of...
sexual orientation.., relative to the admission of any person to, or treatment in
any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement."'35 Finally, GLIB ar-
24. Yackle, supra note 5, at 839.
25. Petitioner's Brief, Hurley (No.94-749).
26. Yackle, supra note 5, at 839-40.
27. Petitioner's Brief at 25-26, Hurley (No. 95-749) (quoting Grand Marshall Lyons as saying
"[Barbara Kay] looked straight at me and she said, 'I cannot, but I will guarantee you that I would
not do anything."' See also Yackle, supra note 5, at 840.
28. Petitioner's Brief, Hurley, (No. 94-749); Respondent's Brief, Hurley, (No. 94-749).
29. Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2341. See also Yackle, supra note 5, at 840; Marc Malkin, St. Pat's
Parade Controversy Moves Its Way Into Boston, BAY WINDOWS, Mar. 5-11, 1992, at 1, 16. Some
commentators have suggested that the catalyst for the dispute over the gay and lesbian organization's
participation in the Parade may have been caused by a demonstration of gay activists in the summer
of 1990. During that summer, ACT-UP/Boston, a gay activist organization, protested the ordination
of several priests at a church in the South End. Protestors were accused of shouting obscenities and
throwing condoms at the priests and their families. According to some accounts, the Catholic commu-
nity of Southie was profoundly offended and resolved to resist gays and lesbians from participating in
the community. Yackle, supra note 5, at 838.
30. Yackle, supra note 5, at 841.
31. Id. Professor Yackle suggests that the compromise was controversial within the gay communi-
ty where Kay was criticized for condoning the stereotype that homosexuals are violent and not dis-
pelling unfounded fears that the citizens of South Boston would respond to GLIB marchers with
violence. Id.
32. Petitioner's Brief at 15, Hurley (No. 94-749).
33. Yackle, supra note 5, at 843. See also Don Aucoin, Veterans Bar Gay Group From St. Pat-
rick Parade, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 10, 1992, at 1.
34. Yackle, supra note 5, at 843.
35. Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2341 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 98 (West 1990)).
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gued that the Council's reasons for GLIB's exclusion were pretextual, and more-
over, the Council's primary reason for excluding GLIB was due to the sexual
orientation of GLIB's members.36
In response, the Council maintained that the Parade was a private event rather
than a public forum and did not constitute a public accommodation under the
state statute." Furthermore, the Council argued that the First Amendment grant-
ed them the right to control the message of the Parade by deciding who would
be permitted to participate." Judge Zobel, of the Massachusetts Superior Court,
rejected the Council's position and issued a temporary restraining order prohibit-
ing the Council from excluding GLIB from the Parade.39 Under the court order,
twenty-five members of GLIB marched in the 1992 Parade.' Although the
marchers were met by both support and criticism from the crowd, most described
GLIB's participation as "uneventful."'"
In December 1992, the Council applied for the city permit to conduct the
1993 Parade.42 The Council's application was granted on the condition that it
cooperate with the police department in developing a "safety plan."
43
The Council, however, denied GLIB's request for a 1993 Parade Registration
Form, claiming that groups with sexual themes conflicted with the Parade's
religious and social values.M Thereafter, GLIB amended its still-pending 1992
complaint alleging that the Council was merely adding to its list of pretextual
reasons for excluding GLIB. 4' Additionally, GLIB argued that the City of Bos-
ton, as evidenced by its "conditional" permit, was actively participating in the
planning of the Parade.'M In response, the Council maintained its previous posi-
tion and attempted to counter GLIB's state action argument on the grounds that
it had declined financial subsidies from the City.47 Pending trial, Judge Zobel
granted a preliminary injunction compelling the Council to permit GLIB to
36. Id. at 2342.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2341 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. B3 and n. 4).
40. Yaclde, supra note 5, at 845.
41. Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2341, (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. B3 and n. 4). See also Margery
Eagan, Law Must Work Equally For All, Unless You're in Massachusetts, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 2,
1994, at 6 (describing parade spectators as including young parents with children holding signs that
read, "God Said Kill Faggots," teenagers who threw beer at GLIB marchers and screamed
obscenities, other young parents shaking the hands of GLIB marchers and grandparents flashing the
"thumbs-up" sign).
42. Petitioner's Brief at 4, Hurley (No. 94-749).
43. Yackle, supra note 5, at 846. The City of Boston was apparently concerned that it was "rea-
sonable to expect" that GLIB marchers might encounter hostility from spectators or other marchers,
and the situation warranted "safety plans." See also Laura Brown, Gays Promise Court Suit In Battle
Over Parade Ban, BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 6, 1992, at 1. (attributing insistence on behalf of the Coun-
cil that GLIB's inclusion in the Parade "posed a considerable safety risk, even with a police escort").
44. Hurley, 115 S.Ct. at 2341. See also Petitioner's Brief at 4, Hurley (No. 94-749).
45. Yackle, supra note 5, at 847.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 848.
1995]
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march in the 1993 Parade.'
C. GLIB's Victory in the Lower Courts
The trial court held that GLIB was "entitled to participate in the Parade on the
same terms and conditions as other participants."'49 In reaching its conclusion,
the court first rejected the Council's contention that the parade was "private,"
holding instead that "the lack of genuine selectivity in choosing participants and
sponsors demonstrates that the Parade is a public event."'  Additionally, the
court reasoned that because the Parade had travelled the same route along public
streets for forty-seven years providing entertainment, amusement and recreation
to participants and spectators alike, it fell within the statutory definition of a
"public accommodation."'" Finally, unable to "discern any specific expressive
purpose which entitled the Parade to protection under the First Amendment," the
court rejected the Council's argument that the First Amendment protected its
right to control the message of the Parade.52 Instead, the court found the
Council's argument to be a pretext for its position that "GLIB would be excluded
because of its values and its message, i.e., its members' sexual orientation."53
48. Petitioner's Brief at 5, Hurley (No. 94-749).
While GLIB's case was working it's way up to the United States Supreme Court, rather than
admit GLIB, the Council canceled the 1994 Parade and led a short protest motorcade down the tradi-
tional route. See David Weber, Court Ruling Dooms Southie Parade, BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 13,
1994 (quoting John "Wacko" Hurley, Parade organizer and spokesperson, as declaring: "[w]e are not
going to be dictated to by any radical group."); Jules Crittenden, Parade Leaders' Irish Is Up Ruling
For Gays Prompts Cancellation, BOSTON HERALD, March 13, 1994 (quoting John "Wacko" Hurley
as saying, "[t]hey're not going to shove anything down our faces that is not our traditional values.").
In 1995, the Council succeeded in having the Parade structured in such a way that the United States
district court approved it as a "protest." The Council severely limited the number of participants and
displayed black flags to symbolize what they claimed were their parade themes: family values and a
protest against earlier court rulings that had allowed GLIB to march in the 1992 and 1993 Parades.
See Puga, supra note 48, at 3.; As a result of the protest, the city of Cambridge, Massachusetts, held
a St. Patrick's Day Parade in which it welcomed GLIB and other gays and lesbians. See Pamela
Ferdinand, Irish Parade in Cambridge to Accent Unity, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 21, 1995, at 15. (quot-
ing local businessman as saying, "Cambridge has a very diverse population. You could never pull an
exclusionary thing here."). The 1995 "Parade/Protest" resulted in what one commentator referred to
as a paradox: GLIB could be excluded in 1995 since the Council was protesting the fact that they
were forbidden from excluding GLIB in 1992 and 1993. See Michael Grunwald, Powerful Legal
Tradition Decided Parade's Fate, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 19, 1995, at 21. But see also, Petitioner's
Brief, Hurley (No. 94-749) (commenting on the "irony" that the court perpetuated protest and divi-
siveness under the goal of being "inclusive").
49. Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2342 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. B27). The trial court dismissed the
case against the City of Boston because there was no state action.
50. Id. (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. B6). In support of its conclusion, the Court noted that the
Council had no written criteria or particular procedures for accepting applicants, the Council occa-
sionally voted on new applications in batches, the Council had occasionally admitted groups who
simply showed up at the Parade without having submitted applications, and the Council did not in-
quire into the views of any applicants. The Court noted that the only common theme among partici-
pants and the sponsors was their public involvement with the Parade.
51. Id. at 2341 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 92A (West 1990)).
52. Id. at 2342.
53. Id. (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. at B4, n. 5, citing Tr. of Closing Arg. 43, 51-52 (Nov. 23,
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Thus, the trial court concluded that the Council did not have a constitutionally
protected First Amendment right and that the Parade was a public recreational
event subject to the state public accommodation law. 4 Accordingly, the trial
court concluded, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts later af-
firmed,55 that GLIB was entitled to march in the Parade.
D. The Supreme Court Decision
The United States Supreme Court framed the issue as "whether the require-
ment to admit a parade contingent expressing a message not of the private
organizers' own choosing violates the First Amendment."56 The United States
Supreme Court unanimously answered in the affirmative and held that the state
court's application of the state public accommodation law requiring GLIB's
inclusion in the Parade violated the Council's First Amendment rights.57 The
Court first determined that a parade is a form of expression, and thus, the
Council's message was entitled to constitutional protection. Second, the Court
determined that the state public accommodation law was within the state's power
and did not violate the Constitution. Finally, the Court determined that to inter-
pret of the state public accommodation law as requiring the veterans to include
GLIB within the Parade violated the Council's First Amendment rights.
In the first step of the Court's analysis, it declared that because the word
"parade" indicates that the marchers are making some sort of "collective point"
to each other as well as spectators, parades are a form of expression and not just
motion." Thus, according to the Court, the protection that attaches to a parade
includes not only its banners and songs, but also the message intended by its
participants."
Examining the expressive value of GLIB's participation in the Parade, the
Court noted that GLIB was formed for the very purpose of marching in the
Parade to celebrate its members' identity as gay, lesbian or bisexual individuals
of Irish descent.' Thus, GLIB's participation was as "equally expressive" as
1993)).
54. Id.
55. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston v. Boston, 636 N.E.2d 1293,
1295-1298 (1994).
56. Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2343.
57. Id. at 2341. As an initial matter, the Court asserted its constitutional duty "to conduct an
independent examination of the record as a whole, without deference to the trial court" because "the
reaches of the First Amendment are ultimately defimed by the facts it is held to embrace." Id. at
2344.
58. Id. at 2345.
59. Id. The Court also noted other factors which do not affect the protected status of parades: the
message need not be narrow or succinct to be entitled to constitutional protection; constitutional
protection is not forfeited merely because the speaker combines "multifarious voices" or fails to edit
them in such a way as to produce a single message; nor must the speakers' communication be entire-
ly original. Id.
60. Hurley, 115 S. CL at 2346.
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other participants.6 Accordingly, the Court found it "understandable" that GLIB
would seek to communicate its ideas in the existing Parade rather than organize
its own.6'
The Court's second step was to consider Massachusetts' public accommoda-
tion law. After summarizing the history of the Massachusetts common law and
its later codification, the Court concluded that the state legislature's continued
expansion of the common law has lead to the prohibition of discrimination on
the basis of "race, color, religious creed, national origin, sex, sexual orienta-
tion .... deafness, blindness or any physical or mental disability or ancestry" in
"the admission of any person to, or treatment in any place of public accommoda-
tion, resort or amusement."63 The Court found the statute to be within the
State's power and inviolate of the First or Fourteenth Amendments."
Furthermore, the Court concluded that, on its face, the statute did not farget
speech or discriminate on the basis of content;' rather, the statute focused on
prohibiting the act of discrimination against individuals in the provision of pub-
licly available goods, privileges and services.'
Finally, the Court considered the "peculiar way" in which the statute was
enforced in this case.67 The enforcement issue centered on the participation of
individuals distinctly identified as gay, lesbian or bisexual, not simply as individ-
uals marching in the parade." According to the Court, because the message of
each individual group affects the overall message of the organizers, requiring the
Council to permit GLIB to march in the Parade essentially altered the expressive
content of the Parade.69 Thus, the Court concluded that the application of the
statute in this case violated the "fundamental rule of protection under the First
Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own
message."'7
The Court distinguished Turner Broadcasting v. FCC which GLIB had relied
on two grounds.7' First, the Court rejected GLIB's contention that, like the ca-
ble operators in Turner Broadcasting, the Council was merely a "conduit" for
speech of parade participants, "rather than itself a speaker" and subsequently
without First Amendment protection.72 The Court rejected GLIB's analogy and
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. (cMNG MASS.GEN.LAws ANN. ch. 272 § 98 (West 1990)).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2347.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2348 (citing Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 114 S.Ct. 2445 (1994)(The
Supreme Court held that, under intermediate scrutiny, the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, requiring cable television operators to carry local broadcast stations, did
not violate the cable operators' First Amendment rights)).
72. Id.
[Vol. VI: 125
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reasoned that while only a small risk existed that cable viewers would assume
that the broadcast stations carried on a cable system conveyed ideas or messages
endorsed by the cable operator, GLIB's participation in the Parade would likely
be perceived as resulting from the Council's determination that GLIB's message
was worthy of presentation and even possibly supported by the Council.73
The Court further distinguished Turner Broadcasting. The Court reasoned that
in the cable operator scenario, there is an inherent possibility of monopolistic
autonomy that could result in some speakers being "shut out."'74 In the Court's
view, it is the existence of this possibility which gives credence to the
"government's interest in limiting monopolistic autonomy in order to allow for
the survival of all broadcasters who might otherwise be silenced and consequent-
ly destroyed."75 The Court, however, found no comparable assertion in this
case; there was no basis for a claim that some speakers would be destroyed in
the absence of enforcement of the public accommodation law.76 The Court did
concede that the size and success of the Parade made it an "enviable vehicle" for
GLIB, but that fact alone, without more, failed to support a claim that the Coun-
cil had a monopoly over access to spectators." Finally, the Court noted that
since GLIB could presumably organize its own parade, GLIB had not shown that
the Council had the capacity to "silence the voice of competing speakers."'78
In conclusion, the Court noted that "[w]hen the law is applied to expressive
activity in the way it was done here, its apparent object is simply to require
speakers to modify the content of their expression to whatever extent beneficia-
ries of the law choose to alter it with messages of their own."' While disavow-
ing any particular view as to the Council's message, the Court cautioned that
mere disapproval of a private speaker's statement is insufficient for compelling
the speaker to alter the message by including one that is more acceptable to
others.'
IV. ANALYSIS
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileg-
es or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law'
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2349.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2350.
77. Id. at 2349.
78. Id. (citing Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 2469 (1994)).
79. Id. at 2350.
80. 1& at 2351.
81. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
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In Hurley, the United States Supreme Court held that requiring the Council to
include GLIB impermissibly altered the Council's message. Specifically, the
Court declared that "one important manifestation of the principle of free speech
is that one who chooses to speak may also decide 'what not to say.' ' , 2 Conse-
quently, as several commentators have wondered, when a group seeks to partici-
pate in a parade in which it is unwelcome, one response appears to be to sched-
ule separate parades at different times or locations to provide each group with a
forum. 3 This is, in fact, exactly what the United States Supreme Court suggest-
ed in Hurley when it noted that GLIB presumably had a "fair shot" at obtaining
its own parade permit. Unfortunately, the Court's response ignores the signifi-
cance of this Parade to GLIB. As one of the largest St. Patrick's Day Parades in
the country, participation offered GLIB the opportunity to join in a community
event as equal citizens that could not be matched by an alternate parade on a
different day. This note examines the Supreme Court's "separate but equal"
suggestion in light of the argument for equality as the primary constitutional
value and concludes that it is GLIB's First Amendment rights, rather than the
Council's, that are entitled to protection.
A. The Reconstruction Amendments: Making Equality the Primary
Constitutional Value
In Hurley, the United States Supreme Court held that requiring the Council to
include GLIB in the Parade violated the Council's First Amendment right to
choose the content of its message. The Court's response is insufficient because it
fails to consider the reconceptualization of the First Amendment that occurred as
a result of the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments which focused on
notions of equality.84 The Fourteenth Amendment altered the original Constitu-
tion and elevated equality to the most important constitutional value.' Thus,
within this new paradigm of equality, free speech depends on individuals pos-
82. Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2347 (citing Pacifica Gas & Electric Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm'n of
Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986)).
83. Yackle, supra note 5, at 802. See also Jeff Jacoby, Whose Parade? Whose Message?, BOS-
TON GLOBE, May 2, 1995, at 15 (arguing that from the outset, GLIB chose to pursue a legal battle
rather than exercise its other option - holding its own parade).
84. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: RAV v. City of St.
Paul, 106 HARV L. REV. 124 (1992) [hereinafter Amar, Missing Amendments] (arguing that free
speech rights should be construed in light of the reconstruction); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights
as a Constitution, 100 YAIE L. J. 1131 (1991) (arguing for a unified reading of the constitution);
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L. J. 1193 (1992)
(arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment reflected a shift in focus to represent outsiders); Thurgood
Marshall, The Constitution's Bicentennial: Commemorating the Wrong Document?, 40 VAND. L REV.
1337 (1987) (arguing that the Reconstruction Amendments significantly altered the original Constitu-
tion, resulting in a new constitution based on notions of equality); Jane Rutherford, Equality as the
Primary Constitutional Value: The Case For Applying Employment Discrimination Laws To Religion,
81 CORNELL L. Rnv. (forthcoming 1995)(arguing that as the primary constitutional value should be
equality, employment discrimination laws should be applicable to religious employers).
85. Rutherford, supra note 84.
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sessing an equal voice.86
Following the Civil War and the end of slavery, the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment set out to critically alter the original Constitution. 7 With the pas-
sage of the Reconstruction Amendments, the very meaning of the Constitution
was forever changed. 8 As Professor Jane Rutherford argued, "[a]mendments are
more than mere additions to the Constitution. They are, by definition, changes,
not addenda. Accordingly, newer amendments change the meaning of the prior
document."89
Furthermore, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued in his provocative article that
a new and different constitution was created by virtue of the Reconstruction
Amendments:
While the Union survived the Civil War, the Constitution did not. In its place
arose a new, more promising basis for justice and equality, the [Flourteenth
[A]mendment, ensuring protection of the life, liberty and property of all persons
against deprivations without due process, and guaranteeing equal protection of
the laws.s
Thus, a new paradigm had been created which focused on the precedence of
individual rights over states' rights, and government action was to be judged by
its impact on equality."
B. "Insiders" and "Outsiders"
Such a radical change in the Constitution required a new interpretation of the
original language. As Professor Amar argued:
[T]he original First Amendment reflected, first and foremost, a desire to protect
relatively popular speech critical of unpopular government policies. The Four-
teenth Amendment shifted this center of gravity toward protection of even un-
86. Id.
87. See supra note 84; For a comprehensive discussion of the nations history in the context of
insider/outsider analysis, see Jane Rutherford, supra note 84. In short, Professor Rutherford argues
that rejection of the status of outsiders and the desire for fuller participation lead the colonists to
revolt and separate from England. Id. Yet, in order to attack the divine right of kings to rule, the
colonists had to substantiate their own authority to rule as equal to the monarch's. Id. Thus, asserting
their independence from England, the colonists couched their claim in terms of equality and declared
that "all Men are created equal." Id.
However, following their success in the Revolutionary War, the founding fathers ceased to
view themselves as "outsiders." Id. Indeed, they were now influential and affluent "insiders." id.
Thus, their original demand for equality was replaced by a governmental structure that was designed
to protect private property and ward off factionalism and individual interests. Id.
Furthermore, while notions of equality were intricately tied to the founding, at the time, women
and African-Americans were not only disenfranchised but also considered the property of others. Id.
This was quite obviously in contradiction with the notions of equality that had supported the very
idea of the social contract. Id. Consequently, egalitarian pressures rose in the form of the abolitionist
and women's movements. Id.
88. Rutherford, supra note 84.
89. Id.
90. Marshall, supra note 84, at 1340.
91. Rutherford, supra note 84.
11
Buske: Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Bosto
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. LAW
popular, eccentric, "offensive" speech, and of speech critical not simply of
government policies, but also of prevailing social norms.'
Thus, the purpose of the First Amendment should be reinterpreted as providing
protection for not only the dominate culture, the "insiders", but also for subordi-
nated groups, the "outsiders."
93
Historically, the people on the outside have primarily been members of racial,
religious and ethnic minorities.94 As outsiders, these people were believed to be
"unqualified for full membership in the community of equal citizens." ' Yet, it
is only through equal participation that outsiders will ever cross the boundary
from the subordinated group to the dominate culture. Only if subordinated groups
are permitted equal access and participation in all aspects of the community will
their opinions be affirmed as having value and will they be acknowledged as
equal members of the community.
Deeply entrenched in a system that subordinates outsiders is the denial of
their voice." Silenced, outsiders are prevented from contributing to the social
definition of other people as well as their own self-definition.97 Consequently,
outsiders are prevented from participating equally in the community. Hence,
when a subordinated group refuses to be silenced and attempts to claim equal
citizenship through expression, they threaten the established identities of the
individual members of the dominant group.98
C. The Court's "Separate but Equal" Inspired Suggestion That GLIB Hold Its
Own Parade Subordinates GLIB to "Outsider" Status, Thereby Denying Their
Equality
In Hurley, a unanimous Court held that forcing the Council to accept GLIB as
a Parade participant impermissibly altered the Council's speech. In effect, the
Court made the determination that it was the Council's First Amendment rights
that must prevail. In so doing, the Court relegated GLIB, as well as other gay,
lesbian and bisexual individuals across the country, to outsider status. In this
instance, the Court said that the rights of a small group of gay, lesbian and bi-
92. Amar, Missing Amendments, supra note 84 at 152-53.
93. Id. at 153-54. Professor Amar suggests that the paradigm speaker under original First
Amendment intent would be someone like John Peter Zenger - a popular publisher intent on estab-
lishing sympathy for his anti-government message. On the other hand, the paradigm speaker under
the First Amendment reconstructed in notions of equality would be someone like Harriet Beecher
Stowe - a cultural outsider whose writings criticized the social order and dominant public opinion.
Id.
94. Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the Subordination of
Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 95, 109 (1990).
95. Id.
96. Professor Karst cites the sit-ins of the civil rights movement as an example: just as the sit-in
was a form of symbolic speech and conveyed the right of blacks to eat where they chose, thereby
allowing them to join the dominant community, so today is the integration of public spaces. Karst,
supra note 94, at 95-96.
97. Id. at 95.
98. Id. at 115.
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sexual individuals to express themselves and participate in the Parade is not on
the same footing as the rights of the Marine Color Guard, the Troy High School
Marching Band, the Tin Can Soldiers or Miss Ice-o-Rama. Thus, the Court has
silenced their voice and denied them the opportunity to participate in the commu-
nity on an equal basis.
Furthermore, to suggest that GLIB acquire its own permit and hold its own
parade marginalizes the value of GLIB's participation while overlooking the
significance of the Parade. GLIB's motives for wanting to participate in one of
the largest St. Patrick's Day celebrations in the country included the fact that its
participants and spectators are comprised of individuals from all walks of the
community. GLIB wished to be a part of a common celebration by the communi-
ty at large. The Court acknowledged this when it stated that it was "understand-
able" that GLIB would prefer to participate in the Parade rather than seek its
own permit. To suggest that GLIB would be just as well off with its own parade
ignores the reality that the great cross-section of the community that participates
as marchers and spectators would not have been available had GLIB staged a
separate parade."
In this instance, the Court has made a value judgement that the Council's
First Amendment rights prevail over those of GLIB. Yet, this is contrary to the
notions of equality entrenched in the Fourteenth Amendment. The
reconceptualization of the First Amendment shifted the focus from protecting the
speech of insiders, to protecting the speech of outsiders. Here, it is clearly the
members of GLIB who are the outsiders. This determination is important because
it is concerned with balancing power, the exclusion of subordinated groups is
more problematic than the exclusion of dominate groups because the subordinat-
ed groups are already at a power disadvantage."° Accordingly, it is GLIB's
First Amendment rights that are entitled to the greatest protection.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's failure to protect the First Amendment rights of a subordinated
group, as mandated by the reconceptualization of the First Amendment through
the Reconstruction Amendments, draws a line in the sand. In essence, by sug-
gesting that GLIB conduct its own parade, the highest court in the land has said
that gays and lesbians have a place, but that place is not as an equal participant
within the community. But another court, the Superior Court of Massachusetts
said, "[h]istory does not record that St. Patrick limited his ministry to heterosex-
uals or that General Washington's soldiers were all straight. Inclusiveness should
be the hallmark of the Parade."'' "Perhaps it only goes to show that there's a
99. More importantly, the Court gave no guidance as to whether GLIB should be permitted to
stage its parade over the traditional route on an alternate day or on the day designated for the Parade
but over a different route. Had the Court had in mind the former, it is difficult to imagine a St.
Patrick's Day Parade on a day other than the one designated by the city for "official" celebrations.
Hurley, 115 S.Ct. at 2338.
100. Rutherford, supra note 84.
101. Petitioner's Brief, Hurley, at 26 (No. 94-749)(citing App. Pet for Cert. at B28).
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new line in the sand that says gay and lesbian participation in the community
stops short of equal participation.' ' 2
Sheryl Buske
102. John Ellement, Justices to Hear Arguments on 1st Amendment Issue in Parade Case, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 22, 1995 (quoting John Ward, GLIB attorney, as suggesting that communities would
tolerate the patronage of gay and lesbian in businesses, but would not tolerate their participation
within the larger community).
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